Kilka już razy pisałem o tym, iż czas na "reset" z reżimem Aleksandra Łukaszenki. W listopadowo - grudniowym numerze New Eastern Europe opublikowałem tekst o - przyznam - nieco prowokacyjnym tytule "Belarus - a role model for the region?", w którym pisałem o swego rodzaju neutralności jako modelu kompromisu pomiędzy Zachodem a Rosją w przestrzeni postsowieckiej. Zakładam bowiem, że nasze hasła o europejskiej perspektywie dla Białorusi (i Ukrainy też) pozostają czekami bez pokrycia, a Zachód w istocie nie ma woli politycznej, by walczyć z Rosją o przyszłość Białorusi i Ukrainy. W mojej ocenie Polska powinna zastanowić się, czy nie warto ograniczyć naszych (skądinąd niemal wyłącznie deklaratywnych) ambicji, tak, aby grając o całą pulę, całej puli nie przegrać. Kto wie czy model neutralności nie byłby lepszą tamą dla neoimperialnych zamierzeń Moskwy, przy czym tamą, do budowy której możemy realnie przekonać naszych partnerów na Zachodzie.
W tym miejscu warto przypomnieć, że skutkiem "finlandyzacji" Finlandii było, jakby nie patrzeć, powstanie nowoczesnego państwa, które po latach balansowania koniec końców stało się częścią Zachodu. Mój tekst nie jest dostępny online (spis treści: http://www.eurozine.com/journals/neweastern/issue/2014-11-12.html) - za zgodą redakcji NEE wklejam go poniżej.
Z pewną dozą nieskromności zauważam, że podobny sposób myślenia prezentuje w najnowszym numerze prestiżowy The Economist w tekście "Belarus and the great bear" (http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21648038-russias-antics-ukraine-are-upending-politics-elsewhere-belarus-and-great-bear). Tekst w The Economist pojawił się w kolumnie Charlemagne - kto wie co to znaczy, ten zrozumie czemu się chwalę :)
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Belarus - a role model for the region?
Since the war in Ukraine, it has become clear, that the West, despite the Russian threat, is highly unlikely to stand up to the Kremlin. It seems, that the West would have to overcome its psychological weaknesses, which are the main reason for which it usually backs down when faced with Russian bullying. This, by the way, is a phenomenon in itself, given the fact that it is the West which is clearly the stronger party. Russia might be similar to the Soviet Union on the psychological level, but not so much when considering its economy or armed forces. In fact, Russia is actually a weak country. Its successes in the war with Ukraine are a result of Ukraine’s dire condition rather than Russian strength.
The Russian economy had been running smoothly until quite recently. However, that was almost exclusively due to high oil prices. The situation is now starting to look sour for Moscow. The state is so corruption-ridden that it took the oil price to go down just slightly to cause serious trouble. Technologically, the Russian economy is in tatters. The army under Vladimir Putin, apart from just a few elite units, is in desperate need of modernisation. Birth rates are dramatically low and Siberia is depopulating. People seem willing to emigrate and, unlike any other country, it is the “haves” who are the first to leave. Logically, the above should lead to a change in the country’s relations with the West, as it is the West which can be a source of modernisation for Russia. But this path is not pursued for one simple reason: it is not the state’s well-being which is at the top of the agenda for the Russian upper class. For the elite it is rather their newly found wealth, which seems to matter the most. Given the fact though, that both the oligarchs as well as the ruling class seem to prefer to invest their fortunes in the EU and in the USA, rather than in Russia itself, the West could easily, albeit assuming it finds the will to do so, stand up to Russia.
A face-off with the Kremlin would require a no-nonsense approach on the one hand, and respect for the partner on the other. It takes years for a person, and generations for a state, to come to terms with the loss of power. A country which is in fact a fading power craves respect. Respect, however, is something which comes only when it is mutual. The Kremlin often says that NATO enlargement was a sign of a lack of respect on behalf of the West. Some in the West seem to agree, forgetting that stability in Central Europe and the success of “old Europe’s” companies in the region are based on the understanding that the former Central European Warsaw Pact members and the Baltic States are a part of the transatlantic security architecture. Should a feeling of insecurity prevail as a result of Russian actions, none of these achievements could be taken for granted. Respect for Russia is something that has to be addressed, but the West should not accept the notion that, by enlarging eastwards, it has somehow disrespected the Kremlin as it was merely adhering to the very principle it was built upon – respect for the free choice of nations.
Some in the West have argued that any kind of increased ties with either Minsk or Kyiv amount to provoking Moscow. This argument is inherited from a bygone era, when great powers divided continents as they saw fit. It is also wrong for another, probably more important, reason though. The Soviet Union was as powerful as it was secretive about its intentions, whereas Russia – quite the opposite – is rather blunt about its goals (but often too weak to do what it intends). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, even in the early 1990s, Moscow made it clear that regaining control over the post-Soviet sphere is merely its mid-term objective. The long-term was and still is dismantling the entire European-NATO and EU based security and political architecture. Giving up on Belarus and Ukraine would therefore neither win over nor even appease Russia; it would merely make it more willing to bring its revanchist agenda to our doorsteps.
It is possible that those in the West who preached EU integration as the right path for Ukraine and Belarus already lost the fight. Others wouldn't mind both countries becoming a part of Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests”, as they would prefer that the whole issue of facing Russia go away quickly. However, as long as Russia has to concentrate on regaining control over Minsk and Kyiv, it will most likely steer clear of an all-out conflict with the West itself. Therefore, it is in the West’s best interest to keep Moscow busy in Kyiv and Minsk.
The Kremlin might despise the West, but as George Kennan famously wrote, “[the Soviet Union] can easily withdraw, and usually does, when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.” Kennan’s words apply to Russia as if they were written today, rather than over half a century ago.
The West should try to work out new ways of working with Belarus and Ukraine - finding a way of doing so which would not further alienate the Kremlin surely won't be easy. One could argue that it is Moscow’s task to mend what has been broken. Indeed that is the case, but given the nationalist (or better – chauvinist) fervour in Moscow, it is unlikely that will ever happen.
The only compromise there can be should be based on a mutual understanding that both Ukraine and Belarus have the right to co-operate both with the West and with Russia, without making a final choice though and therefore steering clear from any sort of a “prestige-engaging showdown”. It might have been naive to assume that Moscow would accept Ukraine’s sudden shift towards the West. It is naive, though, to assume that Ukrainians would ever accept being told their dream of becoming a part of what most of them see as a better (honest, democratic, not corrupt) world will never come true. The world these days is not a chessboard as it used to be in the 19th century, and people’s choices cannot be ignored. Russia might believe that NATO and the EU are the main architects (or rather culprits) of the Maidan, but there is no reason the West should ever subscribe to the logic where things never happen without the West’s sinister meddling. It's high time for Moscow to face the reality, that what it offers does not meet the ambitions of other nations.
Both Ukraine and Belarus in recent years have been drifting closer to the West. The percentage of their foreign trade with Russia has been declining, whereas trade with the EU was on the rise. On the other hand, there was substantial Russian investment in Ukraine and Belarus. People from both countries travelled to Russia to work, as it was easier to find a job in Moscow than to get a visa and travel to the West. And yet, more and more people were dreaming that one day their countries would be like the ones in the West. It seemed as if there was a certain balance. The bloody events in Kyiv triggered an angry response from Russia, which buried this balance. It can be argued that the Maidan was morally right, but politically wrong as it unleashed forces in Russia which made Ukraine lose control over a part of its territory and, by revealing the West’s weakness, undermined the EU's Eastern policy. On the other hand blaming freedom fighters in the streets of Kyiv for dreaming of a better future would be foolish too.
I would suggest that a more conservative and cautious approach, albeit one which does not accept Russian claims for exclusive rights in Eastern Europe, would surely be a safer path. Perhaps a return to the status quo ante is a plausible fix to the situation we have now. Such an approach is a long-term undertaking. Therefore it ought to be based on hard realities.
First of all, the war in Ukraine showed how weak its state institutions really are. However, that gives no right to doubt the existence of Ukraine as a state. Ukraine might be weak, but it remains a state which just went through a democratic election, unlike the terror-ridden satellites Russia created on the territories it occupies. Ukraine lost some territory but managed to, up to a certain moment, put up a proper fight. It was in fact winning the war with Russian backed mercenaries, which forced Moscow to send it own troops over the border. Only then did Kyiv show its weakness. Calling Ukraine a “failed state” is therefore absurd. The situation, however, raises the question as to whether the West was right to concentrate its efforts in Eastern Europe on promoting democracy, rather than supporting the process of strengthening the states. In a peculiar way, the lack of democracy in Belarus means that Alyaksandr Lukashenka, should he ever face a Russian onslaught, would be far more able to put up a fight than Ukraine ever was.
Secondly, the West cannot ignore the fact that championing democracy and transparency means that the local elite has no option but to choose co-operation with Moscow rather than with the West. Most of the local upper class are party to financial schemes which are in no way acceptable in a democratic society.
If we were to imagine Belarus in 20 years – with full domination of Russian capital (including in the media), heavily influenced by Russian culture and language and with Russian linked elites in power – then even a free and fair election would result in a pro-Russian rather than pro-western political party winning the election.
Promoting democracy at this stage ensures quite the opposite, as there is still a large chunk of state-owned property which is up for grabs. With the Belarusian jet set eager to get as wealthy as the Russian and Ukrainian ones, the regime has no other option but to relinquish its grip on the economy, thus buying the elite’s loyalty. The battle for the souls of the upper class (and not of the whole nation) is crucial to the direction of Minsk’s evolution. In Ukraine's case, after the Maidan, the local oligarchs are even more powerful than they ever used to be.
Eastern policy must therefore be addressed to the elite. The history of all democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe show that it is the elite, and in some cases even the regime’s henchmen, who instigate change. The upper class, just like the ones in the former Warsaw Pact countries, would gladly welcome a western leaning government, but only if they were to receive sufficient guarantees that the wealth they have accumulated is to remain in their hands.
There is no doubt that the West cannot accept a regime in Europe which uses heavy handed tactics against the opposition and throws former presidential candidates behind bars. Hence, the only way to build a measure of trust between the West and Belarus would be for the regime in Minsk to free all remaining political prisoners. A compromise would have to be based on an understanding that Belarus would stick to mild authoritarianism and never turn to repression again. The West on its part would have to learn to live with the regime as it is, just as it has been with the regime in Moscow.
Until recently, there could have been no doubt that Moscow would do its best to undermine such a solution to the stalemate between Minsk and Brussels, just as it has done so many times in the past. Moscow was actively fighting any improvement of relations between the West and Minsk or even any serious western investment in Belarus. Notwithstanding the close relations between Minsk and Moscow, Russia has, till now, always been keen to see Belarus isolated, as this guaranteed its role as the sole guarantor of A. Lukashenka’s regime. The President of Belarus is certainly an ally of the Kremlin, but not one which the latter really trusts. On the other hand Belarus, unlike Ukraine, is not divided and Moscow would find ripping it apart an impossible undertaking. The regime, partly due to its authoritarian nature, seems very much in control of the situation.
A compromise between the West and Russia is something hard to imagine. However, the lack of a compromise is something even more unimaginable. Perhaps Belarus could become the testing ground for a solution, which if proved successful could become a model for Ukraine. The solution would be for the West and Russia to agree that Minsk would play a balancing act between the two parties. A. Lukashenka would surely agree, as this has been his policy for the past 20 years.
