Zanik praw aerodynamiki i fizyki nad Smoleńskiem c.d."katastrofa" Tu-154.

Jakim cudem  samolot  Tu-154  przy minimalnym  ciągu  silników, zniżając się  "po ścieżce"  z prędkością  opadania  rzędu  7m/sek

nie tracił  prędkości  postępowej  ?

Nie trzeba niczego  liczyć  ; wystarczy  porównać:

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%84%D0%B0_%D0%A2%D1%83-154_%D0%B2_%D0%9B%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B5

Katastrofa  Tu-154  w  Leningradzie  w 1991 roku.

 В связи с этим РУДы были установлены на 66%, а штурвал отдан «от себя». Данный манёвр привёл к появлению вертикальной перегрузки 0,9g, длившейся 10 секунд, из-за чего экипаж не заметил возрастание вертикальной скорости снижения, которая возросла до 7 м/с, а скорость полёта упала с 280 км/ч до 250 км/ч.

gdy samolot  znajdował sie,  na wysokości  60m ..

..  reżim  pracy  silników  ustawiono  na 66% i  zwiększono  kąt pochylenia  na zniżanie ;  manewr  ten skutkował  powstaniem przeciążenia  0,9g  , które  trwało  przez  10 sekund , wskutek  czego  załoga nie  zauważyła  rosnącej predkości  zniżania, która osiagnęła  7m/s a prędkość  spadła  z 280 km/h  do 250 km/h

Zestawienie:

....

Praktyczna  aerodynamika:

zgodność teorii z praktyką

Kolejny  przykład:

Occurrence Investigation Report SER/002/2017

Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commissionي

AircraftOverranthe Runway during Landing

Boeing 737-300 JY-SOAKing HusseinAirport, Aqaba, Jordan  September2017

https://www.carc.jo/images/news/JY-SOA-17-09-2017-RunwayOverrunduringlanding_final.pdf

 Ciągły  spadek  prędkości  przy zniżaniu  po ścieżce  i klapach  otwartych na  minimum !!

At  time  2442  seconds  (90  feet  radio  altitude)  the  flaps  began  to  extend  from  flaps  5 towards flaps30  (Figure 1.17)

dopiero  na  wysokożci  27metrów!  rozpoczęto  wysuwanie klap  na 30.

I kolejny przykład: Airbus  A321 

na ścieżce  ciąg  40% N1 potem 52%N1  - niższy  niż  wymagany  na ścieżce;

spadek  prędkości  ze 143  do 130  mil/h

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f7bfe5274a1314000647/dft_avsafety_pdf_507767

To re-capture the glidepath, the co-pilot reduced engine thrust close to idle (40% N1) and began a descent. During this descent, the co-pilot continued to fly by a mixture of visual and instrument but at 3 nm from touchdown the aircraft was about 300 feet above the glide slope. The aircraft continued to correct towards the glide path and at 950 feet QNH, with the aircraft still just above the glide path, the co-pilot increased power to about 52% N1. He then reduced power again before once more reselecting about 52% N1 a few seconds later. The power then remained at this setting throughout the remainder of the approach until just before landing. The aircraft continued its descent slightly above the glideslope until at 600 feet agl (900 feet QNH) it passed through the glideslope and began to descend slightly below it. During the approach, the aircraft also diverged from the localiser, first to the right and then to the left by about half a dot. The commander called COME RIGHT after the second divergence and the co-pilot immediately corrected the aircrafts track towards the centre line. The approach speed (VAPP) computed by the Flight Management Guidance System and displayed on the PFDs was 143 kts (VREF + 5 kt) which was consistent with the prevailing weather conditions and the aircrafts weight. However, the airspeed began to decay slowly below this value from about 580 feet agl until the aircraft was at about 70 feet agl when the co-pilot called out that the speed was low; by then the airspeed had dropped to 134 kt. The co-pilot advanced the thrust levers before retarding them to idle six seconds later, at or just after touchdown. During this period the increase in engine N1 was 20% but the airspeed continued to decrease and at touchdown it was 130 kts.

I kolejny przykład:

http://code7700.com/accident_bd-700_c-gxpr.htm

At 1434:21 (T-4) and only 680 feet from the threshold, the autothrottle mode changed from the SPEED to the RETARD mode. This caused the thrust levers to automatically retard to the IDLE position. At this point on the approach, there was no recognition by the crew that the aircraft was on an unsafe flight path.
At 1434:23 (T-2) and 360 feet from the threshold, the crew felt the aircraft sinking, and the airspeed decreased to 102 knots.