Analyzing the statement of Prime Minister Donald Tusk in the context of geopolitics, Polish-American relations, Polish-German relations, and Poland’s national interests in light of his statement as Prime Minister dated May 4, 2026 (during the briefing). The context is clear: the administration of US President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of approximately 5,000 American soldiers from Germany. The journalist’s question concerned the possibility of “capturing” these forces for Poland. Tusk described the matter as “delicate” and stated literally:
“We probably should not, as a state, poach (...). I will not allow Poland to be used in any way to break European solidarity or cooperation.”
Geopolitical assessment in the context of Poland’s interests – here Poland’s security interests are unambiguous and for years have been formulated above party divisions, at least declaratively:
• Poland is a frontline NATO country vis-à-vis Russia (Russia’s aggression against Ukraine continues).
• The strongest guarantor of security is the presence of US troops on the territory of the Republic of Poland – not only rotational (Enhanced Forward Presence), but a permanent base (the so-called Fort Trump, which the PiS governments sought in 2017–2023).
• The United States under Trump 2.0 conducts a transactional policy: it reduces its presence in the “old” NATO countries (Germany, Spain), which pay little for defense, and shifts the burden onto the “new” payers (Poland spends 4.7% of GDP on defense – NATO leader). Although in this case with Germany it was about the consequences of the arrogant statement by the German Chancellor negatively assessing US actions toward Iran.
Tusk made an autonomous decision and consciously resigned from the chance to strengthen the eastern flank of NATO at Germany’s expense. The argument of “European solidarity” is key here – the Prime Minister openly places his private relations with Berlin (and Brussels) higher than bilateral play with Washington (the guarantor of sovereign Poland’s existence in the past century) at the cost of the interests of the State where he is Prime Minister. As critics say, in this way he is repaying his obligations to the people who financed his political career (we remember the advertisements full of German marks at the time – so this story is long). And the consequences for Poland are unfortunately disastrous:
• Security: The loss of potentially 5,000 US soldiers + equipment (including possibly Patriot systems, HIMARS, aviation) weakens deterrence against Russia. Germany has for years blocked or slowed down the permanent presence of the US in the East (fear of “decentralization” of NATO command and loss of influence). In doing so, they act to the detriment of Poland’s security. Tusk de facto accepts the German logic of “one Europe” instead of the Polish logic of “first line of defense.”
• Polish-American relations: Trump values pragmatism and strength. Poland under Tusk presents itself as a country that does not fight for its own interests, but only “preserves solidarity.” Or, in the somewhat journalistic Polish version, it is a German softie. This weakens the negotiating position in Washington – especially given the good relations of President Karol Nawrocki with Trump. The only plus is that the USA knows where such behavior of Prime Minister Tusk comes from.
• Polish-German relations: Tusk scores “points” in Berlin (“we are not poaching soldiers from you”), but at the cost of Polish security. Germany has for years treated Poland instrumentally (Nord Stream 2, blocking nuclear power, pressure to resign from war reparations in the background). This so-called solidarity is one-sided – Berlin does not refrain from actions harmful to Poland (e.g., in the area of energy or migration. Recently, the pushing of illegal immigrants into Poland has started again, as reported by the Border Defense Movement). Summarizing this statement by Tusk, it should be pointed out that it is a classic example of European multilateralism at the expense of Atlantic bilateralism. For Poland (a country with asymmetric dependence on the USA) this is extremely harmful.
This statement should also be assessed in the context of the tasks of the Polish Prime Minister resulting from Articles 146–152 of the Constitution and the implementation of Polish raison d’état – and they are unambiguous:
• To represent the national interests of Poland, and not the interests of the European Union as such.
• To ensure the external security of the state.
• To conduct foreign policy in a sovereign manner, and not subordinated to the interests of any partner (even the largest in the EU).
Article 146 paragraph 9 states that the Council of Ministers exercises general leadership in the field of relations with other states and international organizations.
In Article 151 there is a fragment that clearly defines in the content of the oath taken by Ministers (including the first one) that the good of the Fatherland and the well-being of citizens will be the highest order for them (those Ministers, including the first one). Meanwhile, Prime Minister Tusk directly in his statement:
• Replaces the national interest with the “European” interest (i.e., de facto the German one – the largest player in the EU).
• Uses moralizing rhetoric (“I will not allow breaking solidarity”), which suggests that an active Polish policy for its own benefits would be “inelegant” or even “un-European.”
• Ignores the fact that the USA itself decides on the relocation of its forces – Poland does not “poach,” but should fight for these forces to go where they are most needed (the eastern flank). This is not breaking NATO solidarity, but strengthening it. This is a classic example of the “European complex” of part of the post-1989 elites (as such anti-state behavior is diplomatically described): Poland is supposed to be a “good pupil” of the EU, even at the cost of its own raison d’état. The opposition PiS (Kaczyński, Morawiecki, Szynkowski vel Sęk) reads this as “Tusk = Berlin” – this is not just pure rhetoric – but the meaning of the facts. Historically, Tusk (governments 2007–2014 and from 2023) has consistently built the Berlin–Warsaw–Brussels axis at the cost of sovereign play with Washington.
It is also necessary to assess the impact on the issue of building and strengthening Poland’s sovereignty and here the verdict must also be negative: Tusk’s statement is a regression of Poland’s sovereignty.
• After all, sovereignty is the ability to autonomously define and implement the national interest. Tusk, on the other hand, voluntarily limits Poland’s room for maneuver so as not to irritate Germany. This is not sovereignty – this is deliberate self-limitation. It gives the impression that he represents German interests.
• In the military dimension: the more US soldiers in Poland, the greater the strategic autonomy vis-à-vis Russia and… vis-à-vis potential turmoil in the EU/Germany. The refusal to “poach” therefore weakens this autonomy.
• In the political dimension: the Polish Prime Minister publicly declares that he will not allow Poland to be “used” to strengthen its own position. This is a reversal of the logic of a sovereign state – a sovereign state precisely uses geopolitical opportunities.
• Historical comparison: in 2017–2020 PiS sought Fort Trump despite German objections and achieved an increase in the US presence. Tusk in 2026 voluntarily resigns from a similar chance. The difference is telling.
The statement by Prime Minister Tusk of May 4, 2026 is consistent with his long-term vision of Poland as a “loyal partner in Europe” or, more accurately, an obedient lackey, but in an obvious way contrary to Polish raison d’état in the conditions of hybrid war with Russia and Trump’s transactional policy. The Polish Prime Minister has the duty first and foremost to represent Poland’s interests – not “European solidarity” at the cost of Polish security. As a result, such an attitude does not strengthen, but weakens the sovereignty of the Republic of Poland, making it more dependent on the decisions of Berlin and Brussels, and less on the direct alliance with the USA – the only real guarantor of security in the coming decades. I draw attention to one formulation: real guarantor. What causes the actions of the Polish Prime Minister in the context of this statement to also be assessed in the light of Article 129 of the Penal Code, i.e., the so-called Diplomatic Treason – which states that “Whoever, being authorized to act on behalf of the Republic of Poland in relations with the government of a foreign state or a foreign organization, acts to the detriment of the Republic of Poland, shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of between one and ten years.”
And here, in the light of this statement by the incumbent Prime Minister, we are dealing with a classic fulfillment of the elements of this prohibited act. Because is he, as Prime Minister, not authorized to act on behalf of the Republic of Poland? Well, he is. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland is a person authorized to act on behalf of the Republic of Poland in relations with the governments of other states and international organizations (Article 146 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland – the Council of Ministers directs internal and foreign affairs). Therefore, the subjective elements are fulfilled here.
Did he deliberately not make the decision to fight for the interests of his own country, putting German interests first? Unfortunately, yes. The Prime Minister’s statement read: “We probably should not, as a state, poach (…) I will not allow Poland to be used in any way to break European solidarity or cooperation.”
This is a public declaration of government policy – therefore information about a decision taken in response to a journalist’s question concerning the possible relocation of US troops being withdrawn from Germany to Poland. The doctrine of criminal law indicates that “acting to the detriment” must have the character of a specific act directed against the state in international relations. And as we see, this is exactly the case here. The action of Prime Minister Tusk, as indicated, has such a character. In such cases, direct intent or eventual intent is required. Here it can be argued that this is purposeful intent to act to the detriment (in the purposeful failure to act) of one’s own state. It cannot even be said that Prime Minister Tusk acted with eventual intent. He knows perfectly well and is fully aware of what he is saying – that he will not act today in the interest of Poland and will not fight for the relocation of these 5,000 US soldiers to Poland.
@realDonaldTrump @PeteHegseth @SecRubio @DeptofWar @VP @donaldtusk @NawrockiKn @prezydentpl
Komentarze
Pokaż komentarze