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40 leads that indicate a fabrication at the ‘Severny’ Airport
(based on the analysis of photos available from the ‘Severny’ and on the available witness’ accounts):
1. Lack of any documentation of [morning] departures from the [Polish] Okecie Airport.
4. Difficulties in the determination of the course of events before and during the disaster; especially the determination of its time (8:56, 8:50, 8:41, or maybe some other?).
4a. Disparity between the MAK report and the technical capabilities of the aircraft:
if the airplane - according to the report by the MAK - was over the BERIS point at 7:59am, and over the ASKIL point at 8:22am, then it could have not been a Tupolev, due to the analysis of the speed of [that type] aircraft.
4b. The fact that no distress signal was sent by the airborne and rescue radio installed inside the TU154M aircraft, which the Miller Report (page 51) explains as caused by a disconnection of that transmitter prior to the departure – on 28th Feb. 2010 - by the Head of the Aeronautics Division of the 36th Special Squadron.
5. The fact that among the representatives of the Polish Embassy [in Moscow] awaiting for the President - about 800 meters away from the epicenter – no one could hear the impact of a 90-tonne craft hitting the ground (ie weighing as much as approx. 90 cars).
6. No sign of any distinct crater left after the collapse of a 90-tonne craft – despite the muddy terrain this should be clearly visible.
7. No explicit destruction of the forest by the falling aircraft or its fragments.
8. No fire of the [jet] fuel (12-13 tonnes according to the MAK transcripts!).
9. No sign of any unburned fuel at the crash site.
10. The fact of extinguishing the fires barely by just a few people, some smoking in the immediate vicinity of the wreckage.
11. Radically different witness accounts on the fuel smell - from the "no detectable fuel after the crash" (S. Wisniewski) to "strong smell of fuel" (G. Kwasniewski).
12. The fact that the engines after the crash were not hot and the vegetation around them bore no signs of burn.
13. No part of the wreck appeared scorched.
14. The fact that the parts being extinguished were not hot - the firefighters moved freely over them.
15. The fact that the parts being ‘extinguished’ did not produce any vapour, which should occur at a large temperature difference between the scattered parts and the environment.
16. The fact that the aircraft engines weighing over 2 tonnes and heated during flight to several hundred degrees, did not cause a fire of dry grasses in the clearing.
17. No sign of fire outbreaks on the satellite images over the "crash site" on the 10th of April - while the presence of such fire outbreaks precisely in this area on April the 9th, which may suggest that the film by SW [S. Wisniewski] was shot on the 9th and not on April the 10th.
18. In the photos, visible variation of the profile and geo-physical conditions of the crash site: "disappearing walls", the area once muddy and then covered by dry grass.
19. Birdsong (clearly audible finch) in the movies presented as filmed immediately after the incident: footage by Mr. S. Wisniewski (named on the Russian television as Mr. Sliwinski) and in the “Kolya film”- the impact of 90 tonnes, and the associated rumble should have scared the birds.
20. Presence of a sling (special rope used in aerial drops) in "Kolya’s film".
21. Presence of a section of chain over the tail of the wreck (a possible remnant of the sling fixture used in an aerial drop).
22. No known aerial photographs of the 'crash site'.
23. No visible presence of 96 corpses as well as approx. 100 seats on the crash site - witnesses refer to a few bodies, one chair visible in the photos. Russian nurses reported that “at first there were 5 bodies and soon later nearly 90”.
23a. No dispatch of the Polish Medical Air Rescue units (stationed at the Okecie airport) and of the Medical Airborne Evacuation Unit – to the crash site.
24. No photos of a rescue operation, and no active medical services, suggesting no rescue operation.
26. Items belonging to passengers not present on the site: clothes, bags, suitcases, documents, phones, laptops, sweaters, hats, uniforms, jackets, general caps, etc.
27. No images (as in the Miller Commission Report) that would document the development of the situation over time - from the time of the crash to the transportation of all the bodies. Members of the Miller Commission confirmed at a meeting with the [victims’] families on July 29, 2011, that they saw no bodies at the scene, because when they arrived there in the evening of April 10th 2010, the bodies were already gone.
28. No [preserved] logging records of mobile phones, from which connections were established from the aircraft, at times "close" to the time of the “catastrophe”.
29. Not enough chairs prepared for the expected delegation at the cemetery in Katyn – there were only some 48 chairs with umbrellas.